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We estimate fiscal reaction functions for non-hydrocarbon tax and public spending shares of 
national income and for debt management strategies adopted by Norway and compare these 
with rules that would prevail under the permanent income hypothesis and bird-in-hand rule. 
We conclude that the fiscal reaction functions adopted by Norway have to some extent been 
forward-looking when it comes to the rising pension bill, but backward-looking when it 
comes to hydrocarbon revenues. Still, our results suggest that the imminent costs of a rapidly 
graying population are not sufficiently taken into account in the current fiscal rules, since 
Norway is on a trajectory of turning a current net asset-GDP-ratio close to one into a net debt-
GDP-ratio of two in 2060. Something needs to give in the holy trinity: either the rules of the 
Stabilization fund have to be tightened, or civil servant salaries, benefits and pensions will no 
longer have to be fully indexed to market wages, or the retirement age has to be increased. 
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1. Introduction
Norway puts its oil and gas revenues in a Stabilization Fund and only draws 4 percent per annum 
from this Fund to finance public spending or tax cuts. This way Norway should be able to spread the 
benefits of its hydrocarbon revenues to future generations. Its way of managing resource revenues is 
generally regarded as a good example for other resource-rich countries to follow. But does Norway 
really follow a conservative bird-in-hand (BIH) by consuming only already received hydrocarbon 
revenues? Does Norway implement the hydrocarbon permanent income hypothesis (HC-PIH) in the 
sense that it borrows against future hikes in hydrocarbon revenues and that public consumption 
reacts to permanent hydrocarbon revenues? However, a key challenge for Norway is its rapidly 
graying population and the increase in pension and health care costs that go with that and, 
unfortunately, neither the HC-PIH nor the BIH rules take account of these rising costs. We therefore
argue that HC-PIH and BIH policy rules may not be prudent in light of the rising pension 
commitments. It is preferable to use a permanent income hypothesis rule which takes account of 
future pension obligations as well as future hydrocarbon revenues (the PIH rule). Our empirical 
results suggest that the current fiscal rules imply a too small asset build up to cover for the future 
costs of Norway’s graying population. Consequently, we argue that Norway is locked in a vicious 
policy dilemma unless tough policy choices are faced. However, currently, Norway does not seem
prepared to dismantle itsholy trinity of indexed pensions (and civil servant salaries), an average
actualretirement age of 59 years
2 and the rules of the Stabilization Fund. To make Norway’s fiscal 
stance sustainable, something in this holy trinity has to give. 
We depart from previous empirical cross-country studies on fiscal reactions to hydrocarbon 
windfalls (e.g., Bornhorst, 2008; Ossowski et al., 2008) in five ways. First, we focus on the 
intertemporal aspects of the fiscal stance for one particular country, Norway. This has the advantage 
that one can test the time-series hypotheses of the HC-PIH, PIH and BIH rules and analyze the 
optimal management of public debt and sovereign wealth. Second, the empirical tests of whether 
countries follow the HC-PIH, PIH or BIH rule are not confounded by differences in institutional 
quality, rule of law, degree of corruption, etcetera across countries. Third, we take account of the 
endogeneity of oil/gas windfalls by using instrumental variables. Fourth, thanks to long-term 
budgeting in Norway since the 1950s we are able to calculate time series of forecasted future and 
thus of permanent hydrocarbon revenue and of the ratio of pensioners to the work force. When 
these series are included in our empirical model, they eliminate an important omitted variable bias 
and allow identification of separate effects of current and permanent values, of hydrocarbon 
revenue and the old-age dependency ratio consistent with the theory. Fifth, we provide a theoretical 
underpinning of the fiscal reactions to a windfall of foreign exchange. Our normative theoretical 
framework is based on the theory of tax smoothing and public debt management (Barro, 1979) 
which is also familiar from studies on aggregate consumption (e.g., Deaton, 1992) and on how to 
apply the PIH to the macroeconomic management of natural resource revenues (e.g., Ossowski et 
al., 1979; Barnett and Ossowski, 2003; Medas and Zakharova, 2009). We conduct our analysis by 
expressing all variables as proportions of the national income and find that the optimal long-run size 
of the Stabilization Fund as a fraction of the national income generates sufficient interest income to 
                                                            
2 Including retirement due to disability (www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/dok/nouer/2004/nou-2004-1/5/2.html?id=383409).2
ensure a permanent increase in private and public consumption also after the hydrocarbon revenue 
has ceased to flow. For the Norwegian government, the development of a substantial Fund is itself 
probably seen to be an achievement and something to be proud of. Also, there is no reason to 
quickly pay off a large initial debt as the hike in taxes required to achieve this would violate the 
principle of tax smoothinq. But the Norwegian government may adopt a bird-in-hand rule and have 
a declining interest revenue from the Fund as percentage of the national income. We briefly discuss
extensions such as Fund or debt convergence targets, habit persistence (cf. Leigh and Olters, 2006; 
Olters, 2007), hyperbolic discounting (cf., Laibson, 1997) and precautionary buffers (cf., Sibley, 1975; 
Zeldes, 1989). Our model allows for unemployment and business cycle variations, but we abstract 
from behavioral relationships and general equilibrium effects. Instead, we take prices as given and 
focus on social welfare and intertemporal government budget constraints.
34  
Although existing work on fiscal rules for Norway pays due regard to old-age demographics and the 
rising cost of the pension bill (Jafarov and Leigh, 2007), we hope that our estimated fiscal reaction 
functions for Norway provide valuable insights whence simply imposing the rule that targets a non-
hydrocarbon deficit equal to 4% of the Fund ignores any offsetting budgetary reactions the 
Norwegian government might engage in. To address the issue of fungibility head on, it is important 
to estimate fiscal reaction functions to allow for possible offsetting changes in government spending 
or non-oil tax revenues that are not covered by the 4% rule. We can thus compare our empirically 
estimated rule with the 4% rule and other more stringent rules that imply higher savings rates.
Norway’s fiscal sustainability has also been studied in general equilibrium models (e.g., Heide, et al.,
2006; Holmøy and Stensnes, 2008). These suggest that the current fiscal regime violates tax 
smoothing, since there is evidence for a short-term taxreduction requiring a tax increase in the long 
run. In a model with overlapping generations, one obtains a long-term tax rate of 60 percent
(Galaasen, 2009). We deviate from these calibration exercises by basing projected future 
government reactions on its reactions over the past 50 years and thus anchoring our simulations in 
reality. However, a shortcoming of our analysis is that it is partial equilibrium in that it treats wages, 
prices and interest rates as exogenous variables.  Our results confirm that Norway’sfiscal position is 
sound in the medium run, but that the mix of a higher pension burden and lower hydrocarbon 
income eventually will lead to a buildup of net debt unless there is a structural change in policies 
regarding the welfare state, the Fund or the fiscal rule. This coincides with the analysis of the 
Ministry of Finance, which also projects a rising gap between the pension burden and the return on 
the pension fund. There thus seems to be consensus that sustainability requires tightening of the 
current fiscal regime, adjusting the rules of the Fund or trimming pension rights in the longer run.
5
Section 2 presents stylized facts on the emergence and development of Norway’s hydrocarbon 
revenues,and gives some institutional details that are relevant for fiscal management in Norway. 
Section 3 discusses relevant policy initiatives that have been taken by Norway to manage the 
                                                            
3 An alternative is to evaluate fiscal policy rules in a DSGE framework (Pieschacon, 2008).
4 We thus also do not consider the resource curse, i.e., the negative effect of natural resource exports on the 
rate of economic growth found in cross-section studies emanating from Sachs and Warner (1997). One reason 
for this is that a recent study casts doubt on whether the curse really exists (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008).
5 See Yngvar Tveit, 2006 ( logting.elektron.fo/Nevndargerdabokur/Nevgerdb06/Figgjarnevndin/DK-Nor-
ferd/Myndir/Tilfar/Yngvar.pdf).  3
hydrocarbon windfall. Section 4 presents our analytical framework for optimal setting of the tax rate
as well as the share of government spending, the non-hydrocarbon deficit and public debt as 
fractions of national income. We offer some testable hypotheses on how the non-hydrocarbon
primary budget balance and the tax rate should respond to permanent and transitory shocks. We 
then briefly discuss how our hypotheses must be modified when there is a target for the size of the 
Fund, habit persistence, hyperbolic discounting, a BIH motive, and precautionary saving. Section 5
discusses our empirical specificationand section 6 explains how the permanent values of future 
hydrocarbon revenues and pension spending needs are calculated. Section 7 takes our hypotheses
to Norwegian data and tests for the PIH and its modifications. A novel feature is that we explicitly 
allow for the effects of a return on prospective oil/gas wealth (i.e., the permanent value of future 
oil/gas revenues) and for the effects of anticipated graying of the population on the non-
hydrocarbon primary budget deficit and the national income share of public revenues. Section 8
simulates our estimated fiscal reaction rules, compares them with the HC-PIH and the PIH rules, and 
suggests that the current fiscal stance of Norway is unsustainable unless tough and unpopular policy 
choices are made. Section 9 concludes and offers policy conclusions.
2. Emergence of the hydrocarbon windfall in Norway
In 1969, ten years after the Netherlands found gas in Slochteren, the first oil field within the territory 
of Norway – Ekofisk – was discovered. This was one of the world’s largest offshore oil basins and 
started production in the summer of 1971. Today there are 57 oil and gas fields in production and 
Norway is ranked as the fifth largest exporter and the 11
th largest producer of oil in the world. 
Norway was in 2006 the third largest exporter and sixth largest producer of gas. In 2007 the oil- and 
gas industry constituted 24 and 48 percent of GDP and exports, respectively.
6 OED (2008) suggests 
that about 36 percent of expected total production is currently produced. The peak of oil production 
was probably passed around the turn of the millennium and the composition of production is tilting 
away from oil and other liquids towards gas. In 2007 gas contributed 40 percent of production.
The historical paths for the crude oil price as well as Norway’s oil production and net government 
cash flow from petroleum activities are presented in the left panel of Figure 1. Both the time path of 
oil prices and that of hydrocarbon production and government revenue have a positive trend over 
the past four decades. Part of volatility of government income is caused by oil price fluctuations, but 
the tax regime and government direct engagements have also contributed substantially to volatility
as may be seen from the implicit tax rate – the government share of value added – in the right panel 
of Figure 1. Furthermore, the implicit tax rate on hydrocarbon revenues also has an upward trend.  
                                                            
6 For the history of oil and gas as well as the institutional background, we draw on OED (2008, Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy/Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, www.npd.no/NR/rdonlyres/24468CE3-30DC-497F-9E43-
501FBC48A131/17867/Facts_2008.pdf)4
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Figure 2 decomposes government income from hydrocarbons into seven components. From the late 
1970s to mid 1980s, effective ordinary and special tax rates on value added saw a volatile but 
gradual rise followed by a sharp fall in the late eighties and much lower rates during the 1990s. 
Recent years have seen a sharp rise in these tax rates. Special taxes on hydrocarbons have since the 
early 1990s taken over from ordinary taxes in importance. Together they constitute almost 35
percentof value added. The other big chunk of government revenue is net cash flow from the 
State’s Direct Financial Interest in the gas/oil industry (SDFI). After initial investment outlays of up to 
20 percent of value added in the mid 1980s, net return on state holdings is now more than one fifth 
of value added. Production fees used to be an important source of public revenue, but nowadays are 
almost gone. Dividends from Statoil have recently tracked (with a short lag) the development of oil 
prices and have now reached about 3 percent of value added. Environmental taxes rose from zero in 
1990 to 2.5 percent in 2000 but are a bit over half percent of value added. Area fees contribute even 
less to government revenue. Total public income from hydrocarbon revenues is now about 60
percentof value added, most of it being special and ordinary takes and returns from stake holdings.
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Figure 3 gives net government hydrocarbon revenues as fraction of national income and also the 
permanent value of this series (calculated as the annuity value of the present value of expected 
future hydrocarbon revenues, as reported by the Ministry of Finance since early 1970s and using a 
discount rate of 2 % per year; for more details, see section 6 and appendix 1). This figure indicates 
that government expectations of future hydrocarbon revenue have followed current revenue
closely. Current values are lower than permanent values in the beginning of the hydrocarbon area, 
which is consistent with increasing production soon after oil and gas was discovered. The time path 
of current hydrocarbon revenues now lies above the permanent path as hydrocarbon revenues are 
expected to fall in the future. This should signal a shift from borrowing to saving hydrocarbon 
revenues; something the Norwegian government has started doing for some time.
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The left panel of Figure 4 gives central government expenditure (g) and non-hydrocarbon, non-net 
capital government revenue () as fraction of GDP. The 1960s and 1970s saw a gradual rise in both 
primary spending and non-hydrocarbon taxes. Interestingly, after the onset of hydrocarbon revenue 
in the early 1980s, taxes and spending first fell and then increased relentlessly, roughly in line with 
each other.The right panel of Figure 4 shows the difference between expenditure and taxes, i.e., the 
non-hydrocarbon primary deficit (b). This deficit has fluctuated around two plateaus, with the level 6
shifting in the late 1970s. In the post war, pre-hydrocarbon period the government ran a surplus of 
about 3 percent of GDP. In the later period the average deficit has been around 4 percent of GDP. Oil 
revenue has allowed for running a higher non-hydrocarbon primary deficit. The key question is 
whether the higher non-hydrocarbon primary deficits in hydrocarbon era are sustainable in view of 
the long-term budgetary commitments of the Norwegian government.
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The fiscal rule supported by the Norwegian parliament in Spring 2001 suggests that the government 
on average should keep the structurally adjusted, non-hydrocarbon deficit in year t equal to 4 
percent of the petroleum fund in (end of) year t-1. As can be gleaned from the left panel of Figure 5, 
the level of the deficit relative to the fund was close to 4 percent in 2001, so that the rule may be 
seen as a formalization of going policy at the time.  The right panel of Figure 5 shows the gradual 
increase in net government assets excluding the Fund (negative d) and a switch from a small surplus 
to a somewhat larger deficit for the non-hydrocarbon primary budget deficit. The two episodes in 
the 1980s and 1990s with negative output gaps (high unemployment) are associated with large 
increases in the non-hydrocarbon primary budget deficit. The Norwegian Fund started in 1990 and 
has since then rapidly increased to about 90 percent of GDP. The global financial crisis has wiped out 
a big chunk of the Fund.
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Since we are interested in the intertemporal allocation of hydrocarbon revenue, all lending and 
borrowing and their associated revenues and costs should be taken into account. We therefore use a 
deficit definition cleaned for both net capital income and oil revenue. In contrast, the non-
hydrocarbon budget deficit used by the Ministry of Finance includes net capital income (excluding 
those from hydrocarbon-related assets). The left panel of Figure 6 shows our measure of the non-
hydrocarbon primary deficit together with the non-hydrocarbon deficit and the structural non-
hydrocarbon deficit as defined by the Ministry of Finance (MF). The structural deficit used by the 
Ministry of Finance corrects the deficit for business cycle adjustments.
7 The biggest deviation in our 
definition of the deficit and that of the Ministry of Finance occurs in 2000, which is most likely due to 
different treatment of the state’s direct oil engagement (SDFI).
8    
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7 It corresponds on average to 97% of the value difference since 1985. A regression explaining the difference 
with the business cycle adjustment gives R-squared of 0.87. The structural deficit is net of hydrocarbon 
revenenue and should over time  equal 4% of the fund measured at the end of the previous year. The Ministry 
also corrects for the business cycle, cyclical  variations in transfers from the Central Bank and capital income, 
and  special accounting circumstances (see Revised National Budget for 2004, p. 29).      
8 From 1999 to 2000 the cash flow from this engagement went from 25 billion NOK to 98 billion NOK. We 
assume that income from SDFI is counted as capital income and exclude it from our definition of the deficit. 8
Figure 7 shows the gradual rise in the 67+ dependency ratio in Norway. This has led to a gradual rise 
in the need for funding public pension obligations. In the far future, graying of the economy will 
increase spending needs even further, so that it is sensible to provide for these future needs by 
having a smaller budget deficit or a surplus (see sections 4 and 6). 
Given the relatively small size of Norway, its sovereign wealth fund is very large. Table 1 indicates 
that only two sovereign wealth funds dwarf the Norwegian fund.
Table 1: Sovereign wealth funds –proved oil reserves at end of 2007
UAE - Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority $627 1976 Oil 29.5 3
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings $431 n/a Oil 12.7 2
Norway Government Pension Fund – Global $396.6 1990 Oil 7.1 10
China SAFE Investment Company $347.1 Non-Commodity 0.2 2
China China Investment Corporation $288.8 2007 Non-Commodity 0.1 6
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation $247.5 1981 Non-Commodity 1.9 6
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority $202.8 1953 Oil 12.7 6
China - Hong Kong Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio $193.4 1998 Non-Commodity 1 8
Russia National Welfare Fund $178.5 2008 Oil 0.4 5
Singapore Temasek Holdings $122 1974 Non-Commodity 0.8 10
Source: Updated August 2009, Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, largest funds by assets under 
management(see www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php ).
3. Norwegian policy initiatives
In response to the hydrocarbon windfall, the Norwegian government has produced various policy 
documents and initiatives. In chronological order, they can be summarized as follows.
1973-75: Analytical work by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry, which led to three 
important documents covering Dutch disease issues, size of reserves, likely lifecycles of fields and 
environmental concerns. There was not much discussion of long-run spending needs.
1983: The Tempo Committee headed by Hermod Skånland, Central Bank Governor 1985-94,
producedits report on “The Future of the Petroleum Activity” (NOU 1983: 27). It recommended the 
bird-in-hand approach, which says that the government should put its hydrocarbon revenues in a 
fund and spend only the real return on the assets accumulated in this fund.
9 The Tempo Committee 
also discussed in detail how such a petroleum fund and spending rule should work in practise. It 
pointed out the importance of converting oil and gas assets in the ground into financial assets in a 
fund and of decoupling hydrocarbon income from spending. Due to political pressures to spend, the
Tempo Committee discounted the likelihood of such a Stabilization Fund being implemented and 
therefore recommendedslow extraction of oil and gas as a way to distribute oil and gas wealth to 
future generations.
                                                            
9 See speech (in Norwegian) of research director Ådne Cappelen, Statistics Norway, 2000, for discussion of 
spending of oil money (ssb.no/forskning/foredrag/arkiv/art-2000-10-06-01.html) .9
1988: Policy Committee headed by Professor Erling Steigum, then NHH Bergen, now BI Oslo,
presented its report “The Norwegian Economy in Change - Prospects for National Wealth and 
Economic Policy in the 1990s” (NOU 1988: 21). This report suggested that government spending
should depend on the permanent income of total hydrocarbon wealth consisting of the financial 
fund plus the value of oil and gas reserves in the ground. The calculation of total hydrocarbon wealth 
requires the prediction of an optimal depletion path given expected oil/gas prices, technology and 
interest rates. In contrast to the Tempo Committee, the Steigum Committee did argue for the 
establishment of a financial hydrocarbon fund. It stressed the importance of regarding this fund and
the value of oil and gas reserves in the ground as part of the same portfolio. It also offered
arguments for selling oil before extracting the oil as well as for going short in oil stocks. 
2001: The Norwegian government implemented its 4% BIH rule, which allows for a business-cycle 
corrected deficit equalto 4 percent of the value of the Fund measured in Norwegian kroner at the 
end of year t1. Hence, 4 percent of the value of the Fund at the end of the previous year is allowed 
to be extracted from the Fund and to be used to fund the general government deficit.
2006: The Government Pension Fund of Norway comprises two separately managed funds. The main 
one is the Government Pension Fund Global renamed 1 January 2006 and part of the Norwegian 
Central Bank (formerly The Government Petroleum Fund established in 1990). It manages the 
surplus wealth produced by Norwegian petroleum income (taxes and licenses) and has a value of 
NOK2.385 trillion in August 2009. This makes it the largest pension fund in Europe and the second 
largest in the world. Its objective is to counter the decline of expected petroleum income and to 
smooth the disrupting effects of highly fluctuating oil prices. Since 1998, the fund was allowed to 
invest up to 40 percent of its assets in the international stock market, but this was increased to 60 
percent in 2007. Much of the debate is how to contain the risks in investing in the international stock 
market, ensure ethically sound investments (away from arms and tobacco) and avoid inflation. The 
other fund is the Government Pension Fund Norway renamed 1 January 2006 (formerly The National 
Insurance Scheme Fund established in 1967) has value of NOK 106.9 billion at end of 2006.
2006: The Norwegian government undertook reforms to trim pension rights. Pensions are no longer 
indexed to wage growth but indexed to the average of wage growth and inflation (typically, less). 
Furthermore, the lifetime value of the pension is a fixed amount calculated around age 60 and is 
based on expected average life expectancy for the cohort of 60-year olds. The focus is on keeping 
people in work longer and to retire later whilst allowing for some freedom of choice. The individual 
can decide whether to work long and enjoy a higher pension pay per retirement year or enjoy more
retirement years with a lower pension. The average de facto retirement age (including early 
retirement and partly disabled) is currently (“pre-reform”) around 59 years, but is expected to rise a 
little. Compared with most OECD countries, Norway’s pension system is still very generous.
4. Managing windfall revenue, government debt and the non-hydrocarbon fiscal stance
We put forward a very stark model focused at government policy and meant to illustrate the 
principles of tax smoothing and optimal debt management. We assume that the government has 
access to international capital markets but that private sector agents are credit constrained. 10
Although we allow for unemployment and business cycle variations, we abstract from behavioral 
relationships and focus on social welfare, efficiency losses from taxation and intertemporal budget 
constraints. Let the government budget constraint be given by:
(1)        1   (1 ) , 0, t t t t t t d r d g y n           
where dt is net government debt (liabilities minus assets) at the end of period t, and gt denotes 
government spending (excluding net interest payments), t the non-hydrocarbon tax rate, yt the 
output gap (logarithmic deviation of output from its long-run trend value), and nt hydrocarbon 
revenues (direct and indirect taxes, license fees, environmental taxes, return on government stakes 
in oil and gas fields, dividends) accruing to the government in period t.  The government deficit 
depends negatively on the output gap to reflect that expenditures on unemployment benefits and, 
in as far as the tax system is progressive, tax revenues vary with the business cycle. The parameter 
represents the strengths of these automatic stabilizers. All variables are expressed as fractions of 
national income, so that r indicates the growth-corrected real rate of interest. One can use (1) and 
the no-Ponzi condition that the present value of net government debt as time tends to infinity 
should go to  zero (lim (1 ) 0
s
t s s r d

    ) to obtain the present-value budget constraint for the 
government:
(1)           
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where bt  gt  t   yt stands for the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit.  Equation (1) says that the 
present value of future hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon revenues should not be less than 
government commitments consisting of outstanding net government debt plus the present value of 
future government spending. Alternatively, (1) says that the present value of future hydrocarbon 
revenues should be sufficient to cover outstanding net debt plus the present value of future non-
hydrocarbon primary deficits.
To get a benchmark for optimal fiscal policy and debt management, we specify a social welfare 
function. Let private consumption be given by what is left of output after paying taxes and incurring 
quadratic costs of tax rates due to collection and tax distortions, that is  ct = 1 +  yt  t  ½  t
2
where  > 0. Let social felicity be given by the quasi-linear specification ct ½ (gt*  gt)
2 , where  > 
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subject to (1), where we set the social rate of discount to the growth-corrected real interest rate, 
(1+r) = 1. The BIH rule and other ad-hoc rules are not based on an explicit social welfare criterion.11
4.1.Permanent income hypothesis (PIH and HC-PIH)
The permanent income hypothesis (PIH) follows from minimizing (2) subject to (1). This yields
(3)          
* 1 1, 0, t s t s t s t g g s             
where t indicates the marginal cost of public funds at time t. Hence, a higher tax rate pushes up the 
cost of funds and thus lowers demand for public goods. Furthermore, all expected future tax rates 
equal the current tax rate and similarly for all expected future shortfalls of public spending from 
target. This is the tax smoothing principle. Upon substitution of (3) into (1), we solve for the cost of 
funds and thus for the optimal tax rate, public spending and non-hydrocarbon primary deficit:
(4)  
1 * 1 *
* 1 1
1 1 1 1
* * * *
1 1
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   . If meeting spending targets is of 
overriding importance,  = 0 and 
*
t t g g  regardless of windfalls, recessions or public debt. Solvency 
must then be attained by variations in taxes rather than spending. The permanent value of the 
output gap is set to zero. The PIH summarized by the fiscal reaction functions (4) has the following 
implications:
1. The mere presence of a high net government debt does not warrant debt reduction. The 
temporary hike in tax rates and temporary cuts in public spending needed to achieve this 
violate the principles of tax and consumption smoothing.
2. The non-hydrocarbon deficit should be loosened (tightened) in economic recessions 
(booms).
3. The cost of funds is high if the present value of future spending needs is high and low if the 
return on hydrocarbon wealth is low. Public funds thus become scarcer as future pension 
needs are expected to increase and hydrocarbon revenues run out. As a result, the 
government must raise the tax rate and cut spending.
4. Neither the cost of funds nor the tax rate nor the shortfall of spending form target should 
react to current hydrocarbon revenues or current spending needs.
5. If current spending targets are lower than future expected spending targets, there should be 
a non-hydrocarbon surplus and government saving to provide for future spending needs. 
The PIH thus requires saving in anticipation of graying of the population, so future costs can 12
be paid out of the return on those savings. One should thus save more than permanent 
hydrocarbon rents to provide for future pension obligations (i.e., 
P
t t b n  ). 
6. The non-hydrocarbon deficit should react one-for-one with permanent hydrocarbon 
revenues. Borrowing is called for ahead of a hydrocarbon windfall, but during a windfall 
paying off debt followed by saving is warranted. The saving can be accumulated in a 
sovereign wealth fund during the oil/gas boom, so that the increase in public consumption 
and (via lower tax rates) private consumption can be sustained after the windfall of 
hydrocarbon revenue has ceased to flow. Falling hydrocarbon wealth is thus gradually 
replaced by fund assets. 
7. The size of the sovereign wealth fund that has been accumulated at the end of the windfall 
exactly equals the permanent value of the stream of hydrocarbon revenue evaluated at time 
zero when the news of the future windfall becomes known. The interest on the steady-size 
of the fund is just sufficient to pay for the increase in the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit. 




t t t t g g y d      
where  denotes the growth rate in nominal GDP.
Figure 8 illustrates this way of managing a sovereign wealth fund to sustain permanent increases in 
private and public consumption.
Figure 8: Use of sovereign wealth fund to manage temporary windfall revenue
The PIH requires that the government fully takes account of future spending obligations. If the 
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This will be referred to as the HC-PIH rule, since it does not react to future spending needs such as a 
rising pension bill. As a result, the country saves less, and has a bigger budget deficit, a lower cost of 
funds, lower tax rate and higher spending share.
4.2.Bird-in-Hand rule (BIH)
Norway adopts a BIH rule although the government leaves plenty of room for discretion when 
necessary. The BIH rule states that the government puts all hydrocarbon revenues in the Fund and 
only takes out 4% of the value of the Fund in the previous year for the general budget. This 4% 
corresponds to the supposed real rate of return on the fund (e.g., 5.5% nominal return minus 1.5% 
expected inflation per annum). If real growth is 2% per annum, the growth-corrected real return on 
the Fund r
F would equal 2%. In reality, the equity fund premium over the risk-free growth-corrected 
real interest rate r equals , so that r
F = r + . Governments have discretion to deviate from the 4%-
rule, which is captured by the discretionary transfer ht from the Fund to the general budget. The 
development of the Fundft, government net liabilities (excluding the Fund) lt and net government 
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If the return on investments in the Fund (say, at most 7.5% per annum) is less than 4% plus the rate 
inflation (say, 1.5% per annum) plus the real growth rate of the economy (say, 2% per annum), the 
fund gradually fallsto zero after the windfall has ceased. If as nowadays seems unlikely, the return 
on investments in the Fund is greater (than 7.5% per annum), the Fund will grow indefinitely in size. 
The BIH rule is inefficient, since the government spends oil/gas revenues and reacts only to financial 
wealth in the Fund but not to hydrocarbon wealth in the ground. Precluding borrowing implies that 
consumption is too low ahead of the windfall while consumption is first to low and then to high 
during the windfall, and once the windfall has ceased consumption gradually falls back to its original 
level. Hence, the BIH rule violates the principles of tax and consumption smoothing (e.g., Collier, et 
al., 2009). Also, the BIH rule is unhelpful if the pension burden is expected to rise and the rules of the 
Fund prevent the government from saving more in response tothe rising pension burden.
4.3.Precautionary saving
Although there is uncertainty about oil and gas reserves and extraction technology, the main source 
of uncertainty is future oil prices. The BIH rule can be seen as an ad-hoc way to buffer against future 
oil and price shocks. It implies precaution and a very conservative policy (provided there is no 14
pension bill lurking in the future). It seems preferable, however, to extend the principles of tax and 
consumption smoothing exposited in section 4.1 (as well as the Hotelling principle of optimal oil and 
gas extraction) to allow for the effects of a very volatile stream of hydrocarbon revenues on fiscal 
policy and debt management. Building on the multi-period framework of precautionary saving by 
households with income uncertainty (e.g., Sibley, 1975; Zeldes, 1989), one can show that oil price 
uncertainty induces countries to extract oil and gas more aggressively than suggested by the 
Hotelling rule and to establish precautionary buffers (van der Ploeg, 2009). The magnitudes of these 
effects are stronger the bigger the prudence of the policy maker and the bigger the variance of oil 
price shocks. An inevitable consequence of precautionary buffers is that over time windfalls are 
likely to occur as hydrocarbon revenues turn out better than the conservative forecasts of a prudent 
policy maker, thus producing the financial leeway to have a declining path for the tax rate, rising 
consumption paths, and a rising path for the non-hydrocarbon deficit. Prudence thus implies that 
less oil and gas is left in the ground to avoid a high cost of future oil price fluctuations.
Temporary oil price hikes give rise to temporary windfalls which are mostly saved and there is not 
much action on taxes, public spending or the non-hydrocarbon budget deficit. However, the 
empirical evidence suggests that oil prices follow a near-random walk (Hamilton, 2009). In that case, 
oil price shocks are much more permanent whence positive (negative) oil price shocks permit tax 
cuts (hikes) and boosts to (cuts in) private and public consumption and there should be no saving 
(borrowing) response.
4.4.Extensions: habit persistence, hyperbolic discounting, Fund targets and capital scarcity
The IMF has extended the PIH with habit persistence (Leigh and Olters, 2006; Olters, 2007). The idea 
is that one may be hooked on high levels of consumption during a temporary windfall, but it is tough 
to cut back consumption after the windfall. One way to model this is to replace   
2 * 1
2







s t s t s t g g g         in the social welfare function, where 0 <  < 1 indicates the degree of 
habit persistence. The PIH is modified by adding 1 1 1 *( ) t t t b g rd       to the expression for the 
optimal non-hydrocarbon primary deficit. An estimated value of 0 < * < 1 suggests evidence of 
habit persistence. No habit persistence corresponds to * = 0. With ever-lasting habits * = 1, we 
have 1 1 t t t t b g g b      so that the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit follows a random walk if public 
spending does not change.
Politicians are often impatient and inconsistent. They prefer spending hikes and tax cuts today
rather than tomorrow, but regret these policies in the future when theyhave to face up to budget 
cuts and tax increases to finance repayment of the accumulated debt plus interest. This can be 
rationalized with theories of hyperbolic discounting (cf., Laibson, 1997). This seems less important
for an established democracy like Norway than for more corrupt countries and we therefore abstract 
from these issues.15
Resource-rich countries such as Norway may have targets for the optimal size of the Fund.
10 In that 
case, tax and consumption smoothing is no longer opportune and it can be shown that it is optimal 
to forcefully build up assets in the Fund with a temporary hikes in taxes and cuts spending. As a 
result, tax rates are expected to decline over time and public spending shares to rise over time. The 
reaction coefficient of the deficit to public debt is greater than the real interest rate r in this case.
Finally, we abstract from capital scarcity which seems to be more relevant in resource-rich 
developing countries. For those countries it pays not to use the windfall to accumulate sovereign 
wealth but to use it to bring down debt, lower interest rates, stimulate investment domestically and 
bring forward the path of economic development (Collier, et al., 2009; van der Ploeg and Venables, 
2009a).
11 We also abstract from Dutch disease effects (declining traded and booming non-traded 
and construction sectors) and problems of absorptive capacity (van der Ploeg and Venables, 2009b), 
since these also seem more relevant for developing economies.
12
5. Econometric specification and hypotheses
In our empirical work we allow for the effects of oil/gas income, expectations about future oil/gas
income, the output gap and actual and expected burden of old age pensioners on the budget deficit.
Public spending is projected to change over time due to graying of the population. Projections of 
future oil/gas revenue are also available. We assume a growth-corrected real interest rate of 2%
(assuming an average annual rate of return of 5.5% on the fund minus 1.5% inflation minus 2% real 
growth), which corresponds to the 4% withdrawal rate of the Norwegian fund uncorrected for 
growth. We might distinguish between the growth-corrected real return on investments in the Fund 
r
F and the r to be used for the present-value calculations with net government debt. We contrast the 
HC-PIH with the PIH, BIH rule and the estimated fiscal rules using Norwegian post-WWII data
(section 7), and simulate these four policy rules over the next four decades to assess the 
sustainability of Norway’s fiscal stance (section 8).
The PIH (4) requires that the non-hydrocarbon deficit must equal the return on prospective wealth
plus the differences between actual and permanent spending minus a term depending on the output 
                                                            
10 Governments may also have explicit criteria for debt reduction even though it is hard to rationalize them.
For example, the Maastricht criteria for the EMU specify an ad-hoc debt-GDP target of 60% in which case it is 
optimal to forcefully bring down government debt.
11 A low initial capital stock can induce governments to spend all their oil revenue rather than maintaining a 
stable level of spending out of oil wealth as shown within the context of a neoclassical growth model with 
positive external effects of public spending on consumption and productivity (Takizawa, Gardner and Ueda, 
2004). Effectively, benefits of faster convergence to the steady state dominate losses of lower public spending 
in steady state in economies that start off with a low capital stock.
12 Of course, a major motivation of the 4% rule was to avoid sharp appreciations of the real exchange rate and 
the accompanying Dutch disease effects. The arguments made in Norway around 2001 highlighted the 
importance of gradual phasing in of hydrocarbon revenues, also to avoid absorption problems and capacity 
bottlenecks especially in the non-traded sector. These arguments reinforce the intertemporal allocation 
arguments sketched in section 4.16
gap. The deficit is increased if there are temporary public spending needs (e.g., due to a recession) 
or temporary downturns in tax revenues, but the deficit is reduced if there are future spending 
needs (e.g., for pension obligations). It follows that the growth-corrected deficit must equal 
temporary public spending minus temporary oil revenue. The optimal tax rate and the shortfall of 
public spending from its bliss level should respond to permanent changes in public spending and oil 
revenues and be independent of the output gap and the cycle.
If hydrocarbon revenuedeclines at the rate , the return on prospective hydrocarbon wealth is less 
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This implies a coefficient smaller than one on the actual revenues in regressions 
for the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit.
5.1.Core hypotheses
With exogenous public spending (), we estimate the following time-series regression for the 
non-hydrocarbon primary budget deficit and national income share of government tax revenues:
(6) 0 1 2 1 3 1 4 5 6 7 8
P P
t t t t t t t t t t b n l f y g p n p                       and
(7)      0 1 2 1 3 1 4 5 6 7 8 ,
P P
t t t t t t t t t t n l f y g p n p                       
where pt denotes the share of the number of people in the population older than 65 years divided by 
those in the working-age population, lt the net government fund (excluding the Fund) expressed as a 
fraction of national income, and ft the accumulated reserves in the Fund as a fraction of national 
income. Two main reasons for public spending to deviate from its permanent value are the business 
cycle (picked up by the output gap) and future pension commitments (picked up by the projected 
fraction of pensioners in the population).  Demography is only a good indicator of future pension 
liabilities if pensions are indexed to nominal national income.
13 The share of primary public spending 
directly follows from  . t t t g b    Equation (6) deals with the intertemporal and (7) with the 
intratemporal allocation. The PIH implies the following null hypothesis:
(8)    
1 2 3 4 5 6 8 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0, , 0, 0, 0, 1  and
0, , 0, 1, 0, 1, 0.
r
r
       
       
         
         
Note that the PIH denies a role for actual oil/gas revenues on the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit or 
on the tax rate. Actual oil/gas revenues do affect the normal deficit and should feed straight into 
accumulation of assets (in as far as they exceed the permanent value of oil revenues).
Bornhorst et al. (2008) find in a panel of 30 hydrocarbon-producing countries that the offset 
between hydrocarbon revenues and other revenues is about 20%, but is invariant to other 
                                                            
13 We could introduce a dummy to allow for the effects of changes in indexation laws.17
governance indicators. This suggests that oil-rich countries reduce their non-oil tax take by 20% of 
the oil revenue coming in. The problem with this empirical study is that no attempt is made to 
calculate permanent oil revenue or to correct for the past debt-GNI ratio or permanent projected 
public spending. However, it may be compatible with the PIH (8) if permanent hydrocarbon revenue 
is twenty percent of actual revenue, which is compatible with a rate of decline of hydrocarbon 
revenues  of 8 percent per annum.
With endogenous public spending, it makes more sense to include projected targets of public 
spending:
(6)    0 1 2 1 3 1 4 6 7 8
P P
t t t t t t t t t b n d f y p n p                     and
(7)         0 1 2 1 3 1 4 6 7 8 .
P P
t t t t t t t t t n d f y p n p                     
The relevant null hypothesis is now: 
(8)
1 2 3 4 6 8 7
1 2 3 4 6 7 8
0, , 0, 0, 1  and
0, , 0, 0,0 1, 0.
r
r
      
      
        
         
5.2.Competing hypotheses
Various competing hypotheses are summed up in Table 1. If governments do not adhere to the PIH, 
the non-hydrocarbon primary budget deficit may react to actual rather than permanent oil/gas
revenue. This leads to the alternative hypothesis1 > 0, 0 < 7 < 1 and 0 < 1 < 1, 1 < 7 < 0. 
Governments may also attempt to stabilize escalating public debt or forcefully build up towards a 
target size of the Fund in which case one has 2 >  r and perhaps 2 > r as well. Note that this should 
not affect the coefficient on the Fund. With habit persistence, the current tax rate is a weighted 
average of the PIH tax rate and last year’s tax rate.
If the government has a precautionary motive, it has a tendency to accumulate buffers and gradually 
cut tax rates. This suggests a negative constant in the equation for the non-hydrocarbon primary 
deficit. Ideally, one should allow for the volatility of oil/gas revenues but it is not clear how to 
measure that. 
The BIH rule implies that the government bases spending decisions only on the assets already in 
hand, so it does not borrow against future oil/gas revenue and the non-hydrocarbon deficit is driven 
by the return on existing assets. The BIH amounts to  0
P n  so the corresponding tax rate 
P rd g    is higher and the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit 
P b g g rd    is less than under 
the PIH. As the government accumulates assets and d falls or goes more negative, the tax rate can 
fall (but only then). 18




Current oil/gas income 0, but + with Fund targets 0, but + with Fund targets
Permanent oil/gas income 1, but <1 with Fund targets and 
dropped under the BIH
(1,0), but dropped under the 
BIH
Output gap  0, perhaps + if there some 
counter-cyclical response
Share of pensioners + 0
Permanent share of pensioners  >0
Past debt-GDP ratio r, but >r with Fund targets r, but >r with Fund targes
Past Fund-GDP ratio R r
Past tax share 0, but  with habit persistence* 0, but (0,1) with habit 
persistence (all other 
coefficients should be less)
Public spending 0 0
* With habit persistence the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit ratio reacts less strongly to the permanent share 
of pensioners, permanent oil/gas income and the past debt-GDP ratio. One could test instead whether the 
term  1 1
P
t t t n rd          has a negative effect on the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit ratio. The regression 
coefficients for the public spending share should follow directly from adding those for these two equations.
6. Projections of future spending needs and hydrocarbon revenues needs for Norway
6.1.Future pension obligations and projected deficits
The holy trinity dilemma, implicitly described by the Ministry of Finance (Perspektivmeldingen 2009, 
p. 133), can be summarized by the following three statements:
 With the 4%-rule, the contribution from the Fund to the finance of public welfare spending 
is expected to increase during the coming years. The structural, hydrocarbon-corrected
deficit is expected to increase from 3.5% of mainland GDP in 2007 to 9.5% in 2025. Towards 
2060 this deficit will, however, decrease to an estimated 7% in 2060 due to declining growth 
of the Fund and positive growth in mainland GDP. 
 The gradual decrease in the contribution from hydrocarbon revenues to the government 
budget sets in when demographical changes increase public spending needs.
 Increases inprivate sector productivity do not considerably benefit public finances. Although 
they boost the tax base, they also increases wage and transfer bills given that private and 
public sector wages, benefits and public pensions follow private sector pay.19
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Source: Maintaining the “welfare programs” as today. Source, Ministry of Finance January 2009 
(Perspektivmeldingen)
Even though some reforms have been made (e.g., from 2006 onwards public pension pay is indexed 
only for 50% to wages),
14 the public finances are unsustainable unless the holy trinity is further 
dismantled. Indeed, Figure 9 indicates that uncovered public spending is projected to first fall to 6% 
of mainland GDP in 2020 and then rise to +3% by 2060. Such a volatile path of non-hydrocarbon tax 
rates is according to the PIH-logic very sub-optimal. It would be better to use debt to smooth tax 
rates.
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Source: Ministry of Finance January 2009 (Perspektivmeldingen) and May 2009 (Revised National 
Budget).
To get an idea of how this profile of uncovered government spending comes about, Figures 10 shows 
that including children the dependency ratio is projected to increase to 80% in 2060 while pensions 
and disability transfers are projected to rise to about 15% of mainland GDP by 2060. From about 
                                                            
14 Rights during working years are fully indexed to wages, but individual payments during retirement grow at a 
rate equal to the simple average of inflation and wages.    20
2030 revenue from the Fund is expected to decline. The left panel of Figure 11 confirms the 
inexorable rise in both public expenditures and transfers, together rising from about 8 % of mainland 
GDP in 2007 to about 15 % in 2060. Hence, the primary deficit first rises strongly until 2020, then 
stays flat for the next decade, and then falls gradually all the way to 2060. The right panel of Figure 
11 shows how the 4% rule led to downward adjustment of the sustainable deficit after the global 
financial crisis wiped out large part of the Fund.
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year
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Structural deficit
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Source: Ministry of Finance January 2009 (Perspektivmeldingen) and May 2009 (Revised National 
Budget). Left panel shows percentage points change (of mainland GDP). 
6.2.Projected hydrocarbon revenues
Figure 12 presents production forecasts of annual hydrocarbon production up to 2030. From 2007 
onwards production levels resulting from proven reserves are anticipated to decline substantially in 
the following twenty five years. Even allowing for improved recovery, discoveries of new fields and 
undiscovered resources, production forecasts show a decline in hydrocarbon production levels. This
highlights the temporary nature of Norway’s hydrocarbon windfall.
Figure 12: Production forecast of oil equivalents per year for Norway
Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate/Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.21
Figure 13 shows how the production forecasts give rise to projected net hydrocarbon cash flows to 
the government up to 2060. Obviously, these cash flows are sensitive to the projected oil price. 
More important is that the net cash flow is expected to fall over time. The expected return on the 
Fund is therefore expected to grow until the 2030s and then to taper off.
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Figure 14: Oil price and hydrocarbon production and reserve projections throughout time
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The projected hydrocarbon cash flow to the government depicted in Figure 13 depends on projected 
oil prices and projected oil/gas production levels. They also depend on projected tax/dividend 
regimes, which we assume to be unchanged. Figure 14(a) gives actual oil prices together with the oil 
prices predicted by the Ministry of Finance. Both are measured in fixed 2007 NOK, using Norwegian 
CPI as deflator. Note that forecasts of oil prices have often been revised. In particular, as the years 
progressed, the forecasted ‘Hotelling’ ramps for oil prices have been replaced by forecasts based on 
random walks with drift in line with the empirical evidence (e.g., Hamilton, 2009). The production 
projections of the Norwegian government presented in Figure 14(b) show the hump-pattern for the 
next five decades familiar from Figure 12. They also indicate a large number of revisions. Figure 14(c)
shows that, as a result, the declining paths of hydrocarbon reserves have been continuously revised 
upwards due to improved recoveries and discovery of new fields as already indicated in Figure 12.
6.3.Projected dependency ratios 
Figure 15 gives examples of the Ministry of Finance’s expectations for dependency ratios througout 
time. In the 1970s a turning point in the dependency ratio growth was correctly expected around 
1990, though the levels of the projected dependency ratios were a bit low (upper left panel). In the 
1980s the Ministry expected growth to turn positive around 2000 (upper right panel). This turning 
point was moved ahead in time during the 1990s (lower left panel), but it has yet to happen. By 
comparing the two lower panels, we also see that in the 1998-2001 publication Norway expected 
the growth in the dependency ratio to turn from positive to close to zero in the late 2020s and later 
on to negative. This expectation changed subsequentlyand the three last projections presented in 
the lower right panel show a growing dependency ratio towards 2060. We aim to test whether these  
expectations of the costs of future dependency have affect budgetary decisions of successive 
Norwegian governments.23
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6.4.Calculating permanent values
Usually, (6)-(7) or (6)-(7) are estimated without data on permanent oil/gas revenues accruing to the 
government. In that case, if government believes oil/gas revenue to lasts forever, one has nt
P = nt
and thus 1 = 1 and 1 = 1. If the government perceives changes to oil/gas revenues to be 
temporary, nt
P = 0 and thus 1 = 0 and 1 = 0 must hold. If oil/gas revenues are expected to decline 
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and thus 





    

With declining hydrocarbon revenues and no correction for permanent 
revenues, one should thus expect a coefficient smaller than unity for the effect of hydrocarbon
revenues on the non-hydrocarbon deficit. Better is to use published forecasts of the Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance and use these to calculate the permanent value of future hydrocarbon 
revenues.
15 Figure 18 presents selected permanent values. The upper left panel gives actual 
                                                            
15 An alternative is to approximate historical and projected oil/gas revenues with an estimated ARMA-model 
and extract the permanent component using this DGP. Yet another alternative is to use the value of oil/gas 
reserves in the ground evaluated at current oil prices as an approximation for the present value of the stream 
of present and future hydrocarbon income to the economy, which is accurate with iso-elastic oil/gas demand, 
zero extraction costs and no new discoveries. If St denotes hydrocarbon reserves at time t, 24
production values (measured both as production of oil-equivalents multiplied with the oil price and 
as the value added of the hydrocarbon sector) together with the calculated permanent values, which 
are based on the Ministry of Finance’s expectations throughout time. Permanent values are below
actual values and show a lower growth over time, both features indicating falling and temporary 
hydrocarbon production. The upper right panel of figure 16 decomposes permanent production 
value into permanent oil-equivalents of hydrocarbon production and permanent oil price. The 
permanent production path decreases from its peak in the mid-1980s towards the long-term budget 
of 2002-05. The permanent oil price increasessteadily from mid-1970s until 1998-2001, when it 
peaks. In the last three forecasts the level of the price is still high, albeit somewhat lower than 
around 2000. The overall picture is declining permanent oil production and increasing permanent oil 
price.
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     provided that oil prices satisfy  (1 )
s
t s t p r p    . The Hotelling rule says that 
marginal hydrocarbon revenue minus marginal extraction costs should rise at the market rate of interest, but 
with iso-elastic demand and zero extraction costs this implies that oil prices should increase at the market rate 
of interest. To get nt
P, one needs to multiply the value of hydrocarbon reserves and multiply it with a 
postulated government tax cum dividend rate on hydrocarbon wealth.25
The Ministry of Finance has also published its expectations for State hydrocarbon income directly. 
The lower left panel of figure 16 compares the permanent values of State hydrocarbon income and 
permanent production values as shares of GDP. Given that the Ministry is consistent, the difference 
between the two should be due to the tax scheme. The two series seem to follow each other quite 
closely, with the exception of 1978-81 and 1998-2001, where we see them moving in opposite 
directions. Figure 1 confirms that over time the state has captured a higher share of the production 
value. The lower right panel decomposes permanent GDP into mainland and offshore GDP, the latter 
including the entire hydrocarbon sector. We can see that the relative contribution of offshore GDP 
declines over time as mainland GDP experiences higher growthrates. Figure 7 in section 2 presents 
the permanent dependency ratio together with the current one.  
7. Estimation of fiscal reaction functions
We estimate equations (6) and (7). Identification requires that the regressors are uncorrelated with
the error term. The dependency ratios, measured as population aged 67 or more relative to 
population aged 20-66, should be exogenous to fiscal adjustments. The debt and the fund are 
included with a one year lag and are predetermined from the point of view of the fiscal reaction in 
year t. However, hydrocarbon revenue can be directly influenced by fiscal policy and may thus be 
endogenous. For instance, the government may be tempted to use its majority stake in StatoilHydro 
to increase dividends if spending is high. A positive correlation between spending and hydrocarbon 
income due to endogenous dividends would bias the OLS estimates of the effect of current 
hydrocarbon revenue on public expenses upwards. To avoid such biases, we use current and 
permanent hydrocarbon production value as instruments for current and permanent hydrocarbon 
income. We instrument also permanent hydrocarbon income, because predictions of future income 
may be influenced by current fiscal stance and incomes. Production value and government 
hydrocarbon income are directly related through the tax system and the government’s stakes in 
hydrocarbon enterprises and the empirical results confirm high predictive power of the instruments. 
The exclusion restrictionrequires that the production value relates to the non-oil primary deficit, 
taxes and expenses through hydrocarbon income only, given the controls included. The output gap 
controls for potential effects of hydrocarbon production value via general macroeconomic activity. 
Furthermore, the institutional framework allows for the possibility of political influence on the 
number of licenses issued on each potential field and the allocation of those between different oil 
companies. When the licenses are granted, the oil companies are allowed to determine the 
extraction speed from private economic considerations. The government could in principle influence
depletion speed with the environment tax, but this tax has only a minor impact on the budget (see 
section 2). In addition to the extraction speed, the other component of the production value is the 
oil price, which is accountable for the larger part of the variation in the production value. It is 
determined on the world market and exogenousto Norway.The government’s prediction of 
production value underlies the permanent production value. It is based on factors that are 
exogenous to the current fiscal stance, e.g. geological explorations, private search activity for new 
fields, the speed of depletion in developed fieldsand assumptions about the oil price. The fiscal 
stance could have an impact on future licensing and thus on the prediction of future production 
value, but we argue that this is not a concern for using permanent production value as an 26
instrument.
Table 3 shows the first-stage IV regression (corresponding to our benchmark results of model 3 in 
Table 5 below). Current hydrocarbon production value predicts current hydrocarbon revenue with a 
coefficient of 0.4. For the permanent production value we also find a robust positive relation with a 
coefficient of 0.3. The partial R-squared and the F-tests indicate that predictive power of the 
instruments is good. As we employ two instruments for two endogenous variables, we cannot test 
the exclusion restriction with an over-identification test and rely on the assumptions of exogeneity
discussed above.   
Table 3: First-stage IV estimates with hydrocarbon production value as instrument for revenue
(1a) (1b)
Hydrocarbon revenue current (n) Hydrocarbon revenue permanent (n
p)
Hydrocarbon production value current (v) 0.423*** -0.083*
(0.060) (0.047)
Hydrocarbon production value permanent (v
p) -0.035 0.287***
(0.038) (0.029)
Dependency ratio current (p) -0.180 0.043
(0.292) (0.227)
Dependency ratio permanent (p
p ) 0.138 0.182
(0.196) (0.152)
Last year’s debt (d) 0.030 0.085*
(0.056) (0.044)
Last year’s Fund (f) 0.038 0.133***
(0.036) (0.028)






Shea partial R-squared 0.54 0.69
Partial R-squared 0.55 0.70
F-test for instrument’s predictive power  28.28 53.32
P-value F-test for instrument’s predictive power 0.00 0.00
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Current hydrocarbon revenue current is oil/gas revenue received by 
the  state  as  reported  by  the  Ministry  of  Oil  and  Energy.  Hydrocarbon  production  value  is  hydrocarbon 
production in oil equivalents multiplied with the oil price. The dependency ratio is the population aged 67 and 
higher divided by the population aged 20-66. Permanent values are calculated by the information approach, 
i.e., we use only published expectations from the Ministry of Finance and a 2% discount rate.  Hydrocarbon 
monetary variables are measured in 2007 NOK as share of GDP Debt (i.e., net debt)  and the Fund (the state’s 
pension fund  – previously called the petroleum fund) are measured in current NOK as shares of GDP The 
output gap is the logarithmic deviations from GDP trend, as estimated by the Hodrik-Prescott filter of GDP in 
2000 NOK with the smoothing parameter set to 1600 (the  standard choice of the Norwegian Ministry  of 
Finance for annual data).    
Table 4 reports conventional estimates of fiscal reaction functions excluding permanent values of 
hydrocarbon income. Only two of the three regressions for the primary non-hydrocarbon deficit, 
taxes and expenditure need to be estimated, since the third one follows from adding the first two.
Current hydrocarbon production value is used as instrument for current hydrocarbon revenue, 
which has not been taken account in previous studies. 
If permanent variables are omitted, the coefficient on current hydrocarbon revenues will generally 
reflect effects of both current and permanent values. Current hydrocarbon revenue increases the 
non-hydrocarbon primary deficit with a coefficient of about 0.7, so that on the margin roughly 30% 
of hydrocarbon revenue is saved. This is compatible with the HC-PIH if the government believes 
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if r = 0.02. Interestingly, expected hydrocarbon revenue as percentage 27
of mainland of GDP published by the Ministry of Finance in January 2009 (shown in Figure 13 based 
on an oil price of 65 USD from 2010) implies an average annual decline in this ratio over the period 
2010-2060 of 4.9 percent, which suggests that only 30% of current hydrocarbon revenue should be
used to raise spending or cut taxes and 70% should be saved. This suggests that spending out of 
current hydrocarbon revenue has been too high. The positive effect of current hydrocarbon revenue 
on the non-oil primary deficit is reflected in the negative relationship between current hydrocarbon 
income and non-oil taxes. The coefficient of -1 indicates that one extra Norwegian Krone of current 
hydrocarbon revenue has reduced taxes with one Krone.  
Table 4: IV Estimates of fiscal rules ignoring future hydrocarbon revenues and pension obligations
(2a) (2b) (2c)
Deficit (b) Taxes () Expenditure (g)
IV IV IV
Hydrocarbon revenue current (n) 0.729*** -1.084*** -0.355
(0.229) (0.408) (0.288)
Dependency ratio current (p) 0.386 1.941*** 2.327***
(0.393) (0.701) (0.496)
Last year’s debt (d) -0.082 0.246 0.164
(0.095) (0.169) (0.120)
Last year’s Fund (f) -0.127*** 0.428*** 0.301***
(0.042) (0.075) (0.053)
Output gap (y) -0.512*** 0.248 -0.264
(0.159) (0.283) (0.200)
Constant -0.103* -0.038 -0.141*
(0.060) (0.106) (0.075)
R-squared 0.69 0.57 0.86
Observations 54 54 54
Hydrocarbon  revenue  is  oil  revenue  received  by  the  state  as  reported  by  the  Ministry  of  Oil  and  Energy.  Current  and  permanent 
hydrocarbon production  value  - calculated  as  hydrocarbon production  in oil equivalents  multiplied  with  the oil price – are used  as 
instruments for current and permanent hydrocarbon revenue. The first-stage regressions are shown in Table 3. The dependency ratio is 
population aged 67 and higher divided by the population aged 20-66. Hydrocarbon monetary variables are measured in 2007 NOK as share 
of GDP in 2007 NOK. Debt (i.e., net debt) and the Fund, the state’s pension fund (previously called the petroleum fund) are measured in 
current NOK as shares of GDP. The output gap is the logarithmic  deviation from GDP trend, as estimated by the Hodrik-Prescott filter of 
GDP in 2000 NOK with the smoothing parameter set to 1600 (the standard choice of the Norwegian Ministry of Finance for annual data).    
Wierts and Schotten (2008) estimate fiscal reaction functions for the Dutch budget deficit similar to 
the ones in Table 4, i.e., they suppose that the budget surplus depends on current gas revenues, 
lagged  debt and the output gap. Their coefficient on current gas revenue of 0.78 is close to our 
estimate of 0.73. Furthermore, they find that lagged debt has a significant negative effect on the 
deficit with a coefficient equal to 0.06. This is similar in magnitude to our (insignificant) estimate of 
the effect of debt on the deficit. Their estimate for the coefficient on the output gap, -0.6, is similar 
to ours -0.5.
The coefficients on the output gap in Table 4 also indicate that anti-cyclical demand management 
mainly operates via the budget deficit, not via taxes or public spending. Furthermore, Table 4
suggests that a higher current dependency ratio is associated with a higher level on current public 
spending and a higher tax rate, but not with a higher deficit. A bigger Fund is associated with higher
spending, but somewhat surprisingly also to higher taxes and even a higher primary non-
hydrocarbon deficit.
The estimates presented in Table 4 suffer from omitted variables bias, since permanent hydrocarbon 
revenue and permanent pension burden are excluded. In Table 5 we therefore re–estimate our fiscal 
reaction functions allowing for the effects of time-varying permanent values for hydrocarbon income 
and the dependency ratio (see section 6 and appendix 1 for details on the construction of these 28
variables). This allows us to compare the estimated coefficients with the theoretical predictions 
summarized in Table 2. Regressions (3) presented in Table 5 are our core IV-estimates.
For hydrocarbon revenue and taxes the evidence seems to support the PIH, since there is no 
significant effect of current hydrocarbon revenue on taxes while the coefficient for the effect of 
permanent revenues on taxes is significant and estimated at 1.8. This seems, however, high given 
that the PIH suggests a zero coefficient for current revenue and a coefficient between -1 and 0 for 
permanent revenue. The estimated effects of current and permanent hydrocarbon revenue on the 
primary non-hydrocarbon deficit are 0.52 and 0.35, respectively. This is in line with the PIH with debt 
criteria. The PIH suggests a coefficient equal to one on permanent hydrocarbon revenue and a zero 
coefficient on current hydrocarbon revenue, i.e., only permanent changes should affect 
consumption. The BIH suggests, on the contrary, a zero coefficient on permanent hydrocarbon 
income and only already accumulated assets should affect spending decisions. The positive 
coefficient of 0.52 on current hydrocarbon revenue violates the PIH, but is compatible with the BIH.
The estimated effects of the current and permanent dependency ratios on the non-hydrocarbon 
primary deficit are consistent with the PIH. The positive effect of the current dependency ratio on 
the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit reflects higher spending needs when the dependency ratio is 
high. The negative effect of the permanent dependency ratio on the non-hydrocarbon primary 
deficit suggests that Norway is making provisions for future spending needs arising from the graying 
of the population. The current dependency ratio is positively associated with both taxes and 
expenses, but the coefficient on taxes is smaller than the one on expenses. The pay-as-you go 
system of financing pensions seems to increase taxes, but not sufficiently to cover the transfers and 
necessary negative saving turns up as a higher non-hydrocarbon primary deficit. 
The past debt-GDP and fund-GDP ratios have no significant effect on the primary non-hydrocarbon 
deficit. Still, the debt reaction coefficient is negative and larger than the interest rate, which suggests 
presence of debt criteria. Debt has to have a positive effect on taxes, but the size of 0.25 seems 
implausibly high. The Fund seems to have a positive effect on taxes, which is at variance with the 
theory. We return to the effect of the Fund-GDP ratio below.   Finally, the output gap has a negative 
effect on the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit and no effect on taxes and expenses. 
Regressions (3) in Table 5 are the OLS estimates corresponding to regressions (3). OLS estimates of 
the effect of current and permanent hydrocarbon revenue are biased towards zero in OLS. Judged 
from magnitudes, the bias for the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit is driven by the tax equation. 
Low tax revenue may lead politicians to be overly optimistic on future hydrocarbon revenue in order 
to avoid tax increases. This would create a partial positive correlation between permanent 
hydrocarbon revenue and taxes, so the OLS estimate of the negative effect of permanent 
hydrocarbon revenue on taxes would be biased towards zero. The OLS-bias in the coefficient for 
current hydrocarbon income and taxes is harder to explain. Since the positive coefficient on the 
current dependency ratio in the tax equation is also biased towards zero under OLS, these 
contemporary variables should been seen together. One possibility is that a high current 
dependency ratio makes the government seek extra revenue from the hydrocarbon sector to avoid 
tax increases. The current hydrocarbon income would then be a function of the dependency ratio,29
which may lead to biased OLS coefficients on both the current dependency ratio and current 
hydrocarbon income.
Table 5: IV Estimates of fiscal rules with permanent hydrocarbon revenue and dependency ratio
(3a) (3b) (3c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
Deficit (b) Taxes () Expenditure (g) Deficit (b) Taxes () Expenditure (g)
IV IV IV OLS OLS OLS
Hydrocarbon revenue current (n) 0.516** -0.404 0.112 0.299* 0.043 0.342**
(0.206) (0.327) (0.227) (0.159) (0.235) (0.166)
Hydrocarbon revenue permanent (n
p) 0.354* -1.782*** -1.428*** 0.203 -1.203*** -1.000***
(0.193) (0.306) (0.213) (0.168) (0.248) (0.175)
Dependency ratio current (p) 1.018** 1.699** 2.716*** 1.426*** 0.668 2.094***
(0.421) (0.668) (0.465) (0.395) (0.583) (0.411)
Dependency ratio permanent (p
p) -0.873*** 0.927** 0.054 -0.887*** 0.946** 0.059
(0.294) (0.466) (0.324) (0.308) (0.455) (0.320)
Last year’s debt (d) -0.122 0.252* 0.130 -0.064 0.118 0.054
(0.087) (0.138) (0.096) (0.085) (0.126) (0.089)
Last year’s Fund (f) -0.006 0.386*** 0.380*** 0.050 0.242*** 0.292***
(0.060) (0.095) (0.066) (0.057) (0.085) (0.060)
Output gap (y) -0.529*** 0.324 -0.205 -0.509*** 0.266 -0.243
(0.142) (0.226) (0.157) (0.149) (0.220) (0.155)
Constant -0.051 -0.164* -0.216*** -0.112** -0.008 -0.120**
(0.057) (0.091) (0.063) (0.053) (0.078) (0.055)
R-squared 0.75 0.73 0.91 0.77 0.78 0.93
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  First-stage regressions are shown in Table 3.
In Table 6 we investigate the role of current and permanent hydrocarbon revenue for the non-
hydrocarbon primary deficit during 1954-95 and 1996-2007. This choice of periods is motivated by 
the start of the Fund in 1996. Regression (4a) thus extends regression (3a) in this way, but finds no 
significant effects. Regressions (4b)-(4g) include current hydrocarbon revenue with a separate 
coefficient for the first period. Current hydrocarbon revenue was fully spent, and more so during this 
first part of the Norwegian hydrocarbon area, with a coefficient of about 1.4. Permanent 
hydrocarbon revenue is in none of these regressions significant. We do find, however, that the Fund 
is positively significant in regressions (4b), (4e) and (4g). This occurs if permanent hydrocarbon 
revenue is assumed to have the same coefficient over the whole sample or if permanent 
hydrocarbon revenue for the later period is excluded. The coefficient on the Fund in these 
regressions seems large, 0.10 to 0.17, and it may be that the Fund picks up some of the effect of the 
permanent hydrocarbon revenue from 1996 onwards. Regression (1b) in Table 3, the first stage for 
permanent hydrocarbon revenue, shows a strong correlation between the Fund and permanent 
hydrocarbon revenue. Such a correlation makes it econometrically hard to pick up effects of both. 
Furthermore, as hydrocarbons are depleted and transformed into financial wealth, the permanent
hydrocarbon revenue is gradually being replaced by a permanent return on the Fund. The 
government is therefore expected to focus more attention on the Fund and less on permanent 
hydrocarbon revenue. 
For the permanent dependency ratio we find little variation of the effect throughout our period. In 
separate estimations we estimated this coefficient for different early and late periods with cut offs in 
1980/81, 1985/86, 1990/91, 1995/96 and 2000/01, and it was stable at around -0.8 (the estimates 
varied between -0.75 in the period 1953-95 to -0.99 in the period 1953-90). The Norwegian Ministry 
of Finance has a long tradition of employing fairly sophisticated models in their budget and 
population projections have clearly been available during the whole of our sample period. It 30
therefore seems plausible that the Ministry of Finance has steadily kept an eye on the development 
of the future dependency ratio. 
Table 6: Changing emphasis on hydrocarbon revenue measures over time
(4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) (4e) (4f) (4g)
Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b)
IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Hydrocarbon revenue current (n) 0.711**
(0.344)
Hydrocarbon revenue permanent (n
p) -0.163
(0.253)
Hydrocarbon revenue current (n) ->1995 1.429*** 1.450*** 1.441*** 1.403*** 1.357*** 1.288***
(0.355) (0.388) (0.406) (0.346) (0.339) (0.277)
Hydrocarbon revenue current (n) 1996-> -0.457 -0.414 -0.465
(0.302) (0.330) (0.300)
Hydrocarbon revenue permanent (n
p) ->1995 0.278 -0.137 -0.131 -0.133
(0.316) (0.271) (0.284) (0.250)
Hydrocarbon revenue permanent (n
p) 1996-> -2.137 -0.937 -1.365 -1.329
(2.657) (2.013) (2.062) (2.063)
Dependency ratio current (p) 0.463 0.049 -0.108 -0.147 0.084 -0.133 0.149
(0.793) (0.517) (0.680) (0.711) (0.503) (0.708) (0.484)
Dependency ratio permanent (p
p) -0.254 -0.635** -0.456 -0.356 -0.673** -0.366 -0.673**
(0.732) (0.296) (0.559) (0.576) (0.287) (0.576) (0.278)
Last year’s debt (d) -0.105 -0.328*** -0.314*** -0.297** -0.326*** -0.281** -0.297***
(0.126) (0.106) (0.119) (0.123) (0.107) (0.115) (0.096)
Last year’s Fund (f) 0.235 0.173*** 0.245 0.239 0.157*** 0.232 0.099**
(0.263) (0.066) (0.204) (0.214) (0.059) (0.213) (0.045)
Output gap (y) -0.494** -0.361** -0.376** -0.381** -0.366** -0.409** -0.392***
(0.214) (0.155) (0.169) (0.177) (0.154) (0.165) (0.139)
Dummy=1 ->1995 -0.072 0.049 0.043 0.033 0.050 0.033 0.042
(0.078) (0.066) (0.073) (0.075) (0.065) (0.075) (0.063)
Dummy=1 1996-> -0.035 0.122 0.134 0.106 0.121 0.109 0.084
(0.089) (0.082) (0.092) (0.094) (0.081) (0.094) (0.074)
R-squared 0.58 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.78 0.72 0.80
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Chi2 np 0.82 0.16 0.35
P-value np 0.37 0.69 0.55
Chi2 n 15.44 13.21 15.52
P-value n 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Chi2 np reports the Chi-squared statistics for the test n
p ->1995 = n
p 1996 -> and the P-value n
p the 
corresponding p-value. The analogous is reported for n. We find significant different effects across time of n but not n
p.         
Table 7: Restricting coefficients on net debt and Fund in accordance with current stated fiscal rule
(5a) (5b) (5c) (5d) (5c)
Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b)
IV IV IV IV IV
Hydrocarbon revenue current (n) 0.429** 0.414** 0.340** 0.342** 0.516**
(0.169) (0.174) (0.137) (0.140) (0.206)
Hydrocarbon revenue permanent (np) 0.319* 0.351* 0.319* 0.321* 0.354*
(0.184) (0.191) (0.183) (0.187) (0.193)
Dependency ratio current (p) 1.259*** 1.258*** 1.466*** 1.459*** 1.018**
(0.273) (0.332) (0.148) (0.184) (0.421)
Dependency ratio permanent (pp) -1.038*** -0.804*** -0.958*** -0.944*** -0.873***
(0.196) (0.282) (0.174) (0.282) (0.294)
Last year’s Debt(d) -0.118 -0.040 -0.040*** -0.037 -0.122
(0.086) (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) (0.087)
Last year’s Fund (f) 0.040 -0.002 0.040*** 0.037 -0.006
. (0.059) (0.000) (0.047) (0.060)
Output gap (y) -0.518*** -0.561*** -0.549*** -0.551*** -0.529***
(0.139) (0.137) (0.134) (0.138) (0.142)
Constant -0.061 -0.097*** -0.103*** -0.105*** -0.051
(0.055) (0.030) (0.028) (0.034) (0.057)
R-squared 0.75
Observations 54 54 54 54 54
Chi2 Last year’s Fund (f)=0.04 0.58
P-value Last year’s Fund (f)=0.04 0.45
Chi2 Last year’s Debt (d)=-0.04 0.89
P-value Last year’s Debt (d)=-0.04 0.34
Chi2 Last year’s Fund (f)=0.04 & Last year’s Debt (d)=-0.04 0.89
P-value Last year’s Fund (f)=0.04 & Last year’s Debt (d)=-0.04 0.34
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bold coefficients are imposed. 31
Table 7 restricts the coefficients in the estimated fiscal reaction functions to correspond to Norway’s 
fiscal rule of running a structural non-hydrocarbon deficit equal to 4% of last year’s value of the 
Fund. This rule implies a reaction coefficient for the effect of the Fund-GDP ratio on the non-
hydrocarbon deficit as share of GDP of 0.04. In regression (5a), the coefficient on the Fund is thus set 
to 0.04; in regression (5b) the debt coefficient is set to 0.04; and in regression (5c) both of them are 
set to 0.04. In regression (5d) the restriction is that net debt and the Fund are treated symmetrically, 
i.e. their coefficients should be of the same size, but its exact size is estimated. Qualitatively, these 
restrictions do not make a difference compared to our benchmark model (3a). Regression (5c) 
reproduces the benchmark model; p-values well above 0.10 indicate that we cannot reject the 
coefficients on the net debt and the Fund to equal -0.04 and 0.04, respectively. Figure 17 shows how 
the rule has only recently started to cover a considerable share of the non-hydrocarbon primary 
deficit. It may be too early to test compliance with the rule.Appendix 2 offers some robustness 
checks.     
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Note: the figure shows the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit and the Fund as percentage of GDP.
  
8. Dynamic simulation of estimated fiscal policy, HC-PIH, PIH and BIH rule
We now investigate the sustainability of the fiscal stance given our core regressions(3a) and (5c). 
We use the coefficients obtained by re-estimating (3a) by excluding the insignificant net debt and 
Fund variables (see regression (3A) in Table A.2.3). We compare its implications for the deficit and 
the net debt with the fiscal stance that would result from either the HC-PIH or the PIH. Table 8 gives 
the expressions for the deficit and net debt level under these three policy regimes and figure 18
presents the dynamic simulations.
16
                                                            
16 We use predictions of total transfers to represent government spending in the PIH simulations (implicitly 
assuming that other components of government spending will be a constant fraction of GDP). In our 
regressions, on the other hand, we use the dependency ratio. Our estimated coefficient includes in effect a 
price, which links the dependency ratio to government expenses, in addition to the behavioural effect of 
government spending on the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit, taxes and spending. Given the predictions of 
transfers and the dependency ratio of the Ministry of Finance (Perspektivmeldingen 2009) and our calculations 32
Table 8: Simulated Fiscal Reaction Functions 
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Note: We assume that government spending g equals total transfers, the discount factor is 2%, the return on the fund is 4%, the ratio of net debt to GDP in 
2008 was 0.75, and that total transfers and hydrocarbon revenue to the state follow the paths presented in by Ministry of Finance January 2009 
(Perspektivmeldingen 2009). The estimates are based on percentages of GDP, whereas the projections of Ministry of Finance on Mainland GDP. The projected 
size of the Fund is calculated from expected fund return as published by the Ministry of Finance in the Revised Budget of May 2009 (RNB 09). The return is 
expressed in percentage of Mainland GDP and we have recalculated to GDP using consistent GDP and Mainland GDP series.   


































2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
year
b: Est. fiscal stance b: Est. fiscal stance w debt and fund 0.04




















2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
year
d: Est. fiscal stance d: Est. fiscal stance w debt and fund 0.04
d: HC-PIH d: PIH
Note: The two upper panels present the data for exogenous variables needed for the simulations. These are based on projections of the Ministry of Finance 
from January and May 2009 (Perspektivmeldingen and Revised National Budget). The permanent values are calculated by the authors, applying the 
information approach explained in the appendix. The two lower panels show the simulations of the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit (b) and the net debt (d) 
under four alternative fiscal reaction functions. “Estimated fiscal stance” refers to our econometric model (3A) and “Estimated Fiscal stance w debt and fund 
0.04” to our econometric model (5c) 
                                                                                                                                                                                             




t g p   . Our benchmark 
estimates of the effect of the current and permanent dependency ratio on the non-hydrocarbon primary 
deficit suggest a coefficient of about 1 for the current dependency ratio and a coefficient of about -0.9 for the 
permanent dependency ratio. Translated into government transfers, our estimates imply that a one 
percentage point increase in current government transfers increases the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit with 
about 2 percentage points. A one percentage point increase in permanent government transfers decreases the 
non-hydrocarbon primary deficit with about 2 percentage points. 33
Ignoring future public spending obligations arising from the expected increase in the dependency 
ratio, we observe that the HC-PIH leads to a modest increase in sovereign wealth resulting from 
running a primary non- hydrocarbon deficit of 5-7% of GDP. However, if one takes fully account of 
the rising burden of a graying population, the PIH is appropriate and the government should run a 
much tighter fiscal stance. It should run during the next few years a much smaller primary 
hydrocarbon deficit about 5%-points of GDP less than under the HC-PIH and in the decades 
thereafter a gradually rising primary non-hydrocarbon deficit. This tighter fiscal stance during the 
first two decades under the PIH leads to a much bigger accumulation of sovereign wealth, 282 
percent of GDP compared to 176 percent of GDP under the HC-PIH in 2060, so that its return can pay 
for future spending obligations without having to cut public spending or raise taxes in the future.
Figure 18 indicates that Norway’s estimated fiscal stance, given by 
3A
t b in Table 8, is sustainableand 
leads to a maximum net asset accumulation of 332 percent of GDP in 2042, declining to 285 percent 
in 2060. This is comparable to what is required by the PIH. This estimate misses, however, the effect 
the Fund will have on the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit. If we impose the 4% rule of the Fund and 
use 
5c
t b in Table 8, the outcome is instead a debt accumulation of 210 percent of GDP in 2060. This 
simulation casts serious doubt on whether the prudent reputation of Norway’s fiscal policy is 
warranted.
Figure 19 demonstrates how conventional estimation of fiscal reaction functions leads to biased 
projections for the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit and the net debt-GDP ratio. The figure 
compares the 
5c
t b equation in Table 8 with a conventional estimate where the coefficients of 
permanent hydrocarbon revenue and dependency ratio are set to zero. In both cases the current 
fiscal rule is imposed (the simulation of the conventional estimates is based on column (7) in Table 
A.2.5). If the government fails to take into account that the permanent pension burden is higher 
than the current pension burden, it will run a too large non-hydrocarbon primary deficit. The net 
debt-GDP ratio reaches under such a scenario 418 percent in 2060, compared to 210 percent under 
the forward looking alternative.      
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9. Concluding remarks
We have contrasted the estimated fiscal stance of Norway with the PIH with and without taking 
account of the costs of the rising pension burden and with and without imposing the current fiscal 
rule governing Norway’s sovereign wealth fund. Our main result is that the current fiscal stance of 
Norway is unsustainable and leads to escalation of net debt rather than accumulation of net assets 
to provide for the rise in future spending obligations. This means that the holy trinity of Norwegian 
politics needs to be reassessed. Either the rules of the Stabilization Fund have to be tightened up, so 
that less goes to finance the general budget. Or the dogma of indexing pensions and civil servant 
salaries needs to be abandoned. Or the actual average retirement age of 59 years has to be raised. 
Without reforming this holy trinity, it will not be possible to make Norway’s fiscal stance sustainable.
Our estimates of fiscal reaction functions were inspired by PIH and, to the best of our knowledge; we 
tested for the first time not only the effect of current oil revenues on the fiscal stance but also that 
of the present value of future hydrocarbon revenue. To do this, we offered various ways of 
calculating the permanent value of hydrocarbon revenues based on either government projections 
of reserves and oil prices or on the value of oil and gas under the ground. Furthermore, we used 
instrumental variables to correct for the potential endogeneity of hydrocarbon government revenue. 
We also used government projections of the dependency ratio as a proxy for future spending 
obligations and estimated the effect of both the current and the permanent dependency ratio on 
the fiscal stance. Although our estimates offer evidence that Norway’s fiscal stance has features of
the bird-in-hand rule in the sense that not full account is taken of hydrocarbon wealth under the 
ground, they also indicate that the fiscal stance is a far cry from the permanent income hypothesis.
In future work on fiscal policy responses to natural resource windfalls, we want to explore four
avenues. First, it is interesting to compare the experience of Norway with another hydrocarbon-rich 
economy with a stable political environment, reliable institutions and an effective legal system. The 
Netherlands, for example, has adhered to the Maastricht convergence process and Norway did not. 
Furthermore, the Netherlands first squandered their gas revenue and from 1994 onward put it into 
an economic infrastructure fund and debt reduction while Norway put its oil revenues in a sovereign 
wealth fund. It is interesting to investigate whether the Netherlands investment has gone into ‘white 
elephants’ such as freight railways (cf., Robinson and Torvik, 2005). Second, it is worthwhile to road-
test analytical and empirically estimated fiscal rules in small-scale macroeconomic models of these 
countries. Although one could do this within the context of a real DSGE model as has been done for 
Mexico and Norway (Pieschacon, 2008), it may be more convincing to do this with an official 
econometric model used by the government paying ample attention to the fiscal burden of a 
growing pension bill (e.g.,  Heide, et al., 2006). Third, it is important to study the interaction with 
monetary policy and Taylor rules for the nominal interest rate and investigate the issue of the proper 
division of tasks between the central bank and fiscal authorities of oil-rich economies. Finally, the 
portfolio decisions between assets in the ground and assets in the fund need to be analyzed from 
the finance point of view. So far, the evidence suggests that sovereign wealth funds perform poorly 
due to imperfect diversification – e.g., biases towards countries that share the same culture  and 
poor corporate governance (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2008).35
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Appendix 1: Calculation of permanent values and data appendix
The stock of natural resources at time t, St, must equal the sum of current and all future extractions, 
Rs, st, that is
0 . t t i i S R
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  . There 
are various ways to calculate permanent income if, say, forecasts are available three years ahead:
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3) Hotelling rule: If demand is iso-elastic and marginal extraction costs are zero, the Hotelling 
rule is  (1 )
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It is easy to generalize these expressions to the general case with T years ahead projections.
Our benchmark permanent values follow the “information approach”. 
e
t T X  is the Ministry of 
Finance’s (MF) expected value of  t T X  at time t. In our context  t X equals hydrocarbon income, oil 
price, hydrocarbon production, dependency ratio or GDP.  T is the year farthest into the future for 
which a projection was given. 
e
t i X  is based on forecasts of the Ministry of Finance at time t. Up to 
2005 we use long-term budgets (Langtidsprogram) as our source for the Ministry’s expectations. The 
first long-term budget was published in 1953 with budgeting for the succeeding four years (1954-
57). The practice of a new long term budget every fourth year was maintained up to 2001, covering 
2002-05. Since then long-term budgeting has been replaced by long-run perspectives 
(Perspektivmelding 2004 and 2009). We have supplemented the long-term budgets and perspectives
with detailed information from three parliamentary documents that explicitly address hydrocarbon-
issues ( Stortingsmelding 25 1973-74, Stortingsmeldig 30 1973-74 and Tempomeldingen NOU 
1988:27).
17
Projections of hydrocarbon production and reserves are comparable over time, since they are given 
in volumes and we convert all to Standard cubic meters oil equivalents (Sm3 oil equivalents). Oil 
price and production value projections are recalculated to 2007-NOK for consistent comparison over 
time.
The dependency ratio of interest to the Ministry of Finance has changed over time. The lower age of 
the labor force has increased over time, while the pension age has varied between 65 and 70. We 
calculate the growth rate of the predicted dependency ratio at the time and apply this growth rate
to the current dependency ratio convention of population aged 67 or more relative to population 
aged 20-66. We use the actual 67+/20-66 ratio forthe year the projection was published as the start 
                                                            
17 The budget documents up to 1998-2001 were found in the Library of Statistics Norway. The later documents 





of each projection. For GDP, the Ministry’s projections focus on growth in fixed price GDP and we 
apply its projected growth rates to a starting point set by GDP in 2007 prices. We focus on the fiscal 
reaction functions for the central government, which is the receiver of public hydrocarbon rents, and 
the following therefore refers to the central government. Table A.1.1 presents the data and variables 
employed in this paper.
Table A.1.1: Variable definitions and data sources
Variables Years Definition Table  Publication Inst. www
Government revenue (including net capital income) 1954-1975 Total revenue -interest payments -
transfers from abroad





















+ Net cash flow SDFI
+ Dividend StatoilHydro










p = Hydrocarbon revenue permanent Calculated based on projections by 
Ministry of Finance and 
"information" approach
Calculated
Government expenditures (excluding capital expenses) 1954-1975 Total expenditure - Increase in net 
claims - interest payments




1976-1977 Total expenditure - interest 
payments





1978-2007 Transfers + Government 
consumption










1970-2007 Capital income  Database of the









1970-2007 Capital expenses Database of the 









1970-2007 Database of the 





Gross debt 1954-1969 Growth rate applied to calculate 
backwards from level in 1970




1970-2007 Database of the 











GDP deflator (expenditure side) 1954-2007 Index equal to 100 in 2000, but rescaled to 1 in 
2007 so all fixed prices measured in 2007 NOK






Non-hydrocarbon government revenue Total government revenue -
Hydrocarbon revenue
Calculated
Net Capital income Capital income - Capital expenses Calculated
 = Non-hydrocarbon primary government revenue Non-hydrocarbon government 
revenue - (Net capital income -  
Net cash flow SDFI - Dividend 
StatoilHydro)
Calculated
g = Government expenditures Government expenditures Calculated
b = Non-hydrocarbon primary government deficit Non-hydrocarbon primary 
government revenue - Government 
expenditures
Calculated39
p = Dependency ratio current 1954-2007 Population aged 67 and higher 
divided by population aged 20-66 





p = Dependency ratio permanent Calculated based on projections by 
Ministry of Finance and 
"information" approach
Calculated






f = Fund 1954-1995 Set to zero
1996-2007 Fund value in current NOK by December 31st Central bank of Norway
y = output gap 1954-2007 Gross Domestic Product in 2000 NOK, log of 
Gross Domestic Product as deviation from HP-
trend with smoothing parameter set to 1600. 
HP-filtering was done by the authors






Appendix 2: Robustness checks
Predictions of hydrocarbon production and hydrocarbon revenue may be influenced by the state of 
the hydrocarbon sector, thus creating a high correlation between the two. For instance, high oil 
prices may create optimistic projections of future hydrocarbon revenue. This could make it hard 
identify the effect of current and permanent hydrocarbon revenue at the same time due to 
multicolinearity. Regressions (5a)-(5c) and (5a)-(5c) in Table A.2.1 re-estimates Table 5 with 
permanent and current hydrocarbon revenue excluded. The estimates are in general stable. The 
largest difference seems to be the estimated effect on taxes of current hydrocarbon income, which 
becomes significantly negative if permanent hydrocarbon revenue is excluded. This can be seen as 
omitted variables bias; current hydrocarbon income picks up some of the effect of permanent 
hydrocarbon income if the latter is omitted.   
Table A.2.1: Excluding either permanent or current hydrocarbon revenue
(5a) (5b) (5c) (5a) (5b) (5c)
Deficit (b) Taxes () Expenditure (g) Deficit (b) Taxes () Expenditure (g)
Hydrocarbon revenue current (n) 0.633*** -0.992** -0.360
(0.208) (0.392) (0.288)
Hydrocarbon revenue permanent (n
p ) 0.526*** -1.917*** -1.390***
(0.198) (0.300) (0.215)
Dependency ratio current (p) 1.105*** 1.259 2.364*** 1.614*** 1.232** 2.846***
(0.423) (0.798) (0.586) (0.342) (0.517) (0.371)
Dependency ratio permanent (p
P) -0.849*** 0.806 -0.043 -0.927*** 0.969** 0.043
(0.300) (0.565) (0.415) (0.303) (0.457) (0.328)
Last year’s Debt (d) -0.130 0.292* 0.162 -0.012 0.166 0.154*
(0.089) (0.168) (0.123) (0.077) (0.116) (0.083)
Last year’s Fund (f) 0.012 0.296*** 0.308*** 0.068 0.328*** 0.396***
(0.060) (0.112) (0.083) (0.052) (0.078) (0.056)
Output gap (y) -0.514*** 0.250 -0.264 -0.512*** 0.310 -0.201
(0.145) (0.273) (0.200) (0.146) (0.221) (0.159)
Constant -0.070 -0.069 -0.139* -0.132*** -0.101 -0.233***
(0.057) (0.107) (0.078) (0.046) (0.070) (0.050)
R-squared 0.74 0.60 0.86 0.74 0.74 0.91
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 5440
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Note: (1) the “Information” series is based only on information found in the publications by the Ministry of 
Finance and is our preferred method; (2) the “Forever” series assumes that the last observed expectation point 
holds forever after; and (3) the “Hotelling” series assumes that extraction patterns follow the Hotelling rule 
corresponding to zero extraction costs and iso-elastic demand. See Appendix 1 for details of the calculations.
Figure A.2.1 shows the three alternative measures for the permanent hydrocarbon production value. 
To further investigate robustness, regressions (6a)-(6c) in Table A.2.2 present estimates when 
permanent values of hydrocarbon production value (the instruments for permanent hydrocarbon 
revenue) are calculated by assuming that the last projected value for each projection period to last 
forever. Regressions (6a)-(6c) assume that depletion of hydrocarbon reserves follows the Hotelling 
rule. The measure used in Table 5 is, in contrast, calculated by using only the available information 
avoiding strong assumptions about the future dependency ratio (see Appendix 1 for more on these 
methods). Compared to the estimates presented in Table 5, the instruments calculated by the 
“Forever” approach in general push up the coefficient on permanent hydrocarbon revenue, whereas 
the instruments calculated with the Hotelling approach push down this coefficient. Coefficients on 
the other variables are not much affected. 
Table A.2.2: Instruments for permanent hydrocarbon revenue calculated with alternative methods
(6a) (6b) (6c) (6a) (6b) (6c)
Forever Approach on Instruments Hotelling Approach on Instruments
Deficit (b) Taxes () Expenditure (g) Deficit (b) Taxes () Expenditure (g)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Hydrocarbon revenue current (n) 0.487** -0.346 0.141 0.543** -0.500 0.043
(0.207) (0.335) (0.231) (0.211) (0.328) (0.226)
Hydrocarbon revenue permanent (n
p) 0.442** -1.957*** -1.515*** 0.272 -1.491*** -1.219***
(0.216) (0.349) (0.241) (0.185) (0.287) (0.198)
Dependency ratio current (p) 0.996** 1.742** 2.738*** 1.038** 1.627** 2.665***
(0.427) (0.690) (0.477) (0.416) (0.645) (0.446)
Dependency ratio permanent (p
p) -0.879*** 0.939* 0.060 -0.868*** 0.907** 0.040
(0.297) (0.479) (0.331) (0.293) (0.454) (0.314)
Last year’s Debt (d) -0.120 0.248* 0.128 -0.124 0.259* 0.134
(0.088) (0.142) (0.098) (0.087) (0.135) (0.093)
Last year’s Fund (f) -0.010 0.395*** 0.385*** -0.002 0.371*** 0.370***
(0.061) (0.099) (0.068) (0.059) (0.092) (0.063)
Output gap (y) -0.533*** 0.331 -0.202 -0.526*** 0.312 -0.214
(0.144) (0.232) (0.160) (0.142) (0.219) (0.152)
Constant -0.047 -0.174* -0.221*** -0.056 -0.149* -0.205***
(0.058) (0.094) (0.065) (0.056) (0.087) (0.060)
R-squared 0.75 0.71 0.91 0.75 0.74 0.92
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54
Chi2 n vs n
p 0.02 9.31 20.63 0.73 4.07 13.84
P-value n vs n
p 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.04 0.0041
We conclude that our benchmark estimates in Table 5 represent the middle ground. Furthermore, our 
assumption about hydrocarbon production value beyond the horizon in the public forecasts does not seem 
crucially important for our results.
In the simulations we use the coefficients from re-estimating the naive regression (2a) of Table 4 and our core 
regressions (3a) of Table 5 by leaving out the insignificant coefficients. The resulting estimates are reported as 
regression (2A) and (3A) in Table A.2.3.
Table A.2.3: Re-estimating core regression excluding insignificant coefficients
(3a) (3A)
Deficit (b) Deficit (b)
Hydrocarbon revenue current (n) 0.516** 0.355**
(0.206) (0.141)
Hydrocarbon revenue permanent (n
p) 0.354* 0.403*
(0.193) (0.209)
Dependency ratio current (p) 1.018** 1.373***
(0.421) (0.151)
Dependency ratio permanent (p
p) -0.873*** -0.796***
(0.294) (0.183)
Last year’s Debt (d) -0.122
(0.087)
Last year’s Fund (f) -0.006
(0.060)






Table A.2.4: Restricting coefficients on net debt and Fund in accordance with current stated fiscal rule under 
conventional approach 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b)
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Main
Hydrocarbon revenue current (n) 0.729*** 0.729*** -0.091 0.671*** -0.025 0.417***
(0.229) (0.229) (0.102) (0.185) (0.090) (0.138)
Dependency ratio current (p) 0.386 0.386 1.350*** 0.543*** 0.954*** 1.037*** 0.934***
(0.393) (0.393) (0.322) (0.158) (0.134) (0.124) (0.112)
L.Debt (d) -0.082 -0.082 0.080 -0.040 -0.040*** 0.076*** -0.040***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000)
L.fund 1996-> -0.127*** -0.127*** 0.040 -0.119*** 0.040*** -0.076*** 0.040***
(0.042) (0.042) . (0.038) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000)
Output gap (y) -0.512*** -0.512*** -0.412** -0.530*** -0.333** -0.552*** -0.334**
(0.159) (0.159) (0.163) (0.152) (0.155) (0.151) (0.155)
Constant -0.103* -0.103* -0.252*** -0.126*** -0.196*** -0.198*** -0.193***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.048) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023)
R-squared 0.69





Chi2 l.f=0.04 & l.d=-0.04 0.19
P-value l.f=0.04 & l.d=-0.04 0.6642
Table A.2.5 shows estimates for alternative deficit measures. In column (1) and (2) we use the non-
hydrocarbon deficit, i.e. net capital income except returns from the Fund is included on the revenue 
side. Column (2) differs from (1) by the imposed restrictions of -0.04 and 0.04 on net debt and the 
fund. The main difference compared to our other estimates is the coefficient on permanent 
hydrocarbon revenue, which now turns up with a smaller and insignificant coefficient. The 
coefficient of about 0.55 on current hydrocarbon revenue suggest a bird-in-hand approach in the 
spending of hydrocarbon rents, whereas the negative coefficient on the permanent dependency 
ratio suggests forward looking behavior with respect to the pension bill.  
Table A.2.5: Estimates with alternative deficit measures 
(1) (2)
Deficit non-hydrocarbon Deficit non-hydrocarbon
IV IV




Hydrocarbon revenue permanent (n
p ) 0.061 0.045
(0.161) (0.158)









L.Debt (d) 0.018 -0.040
(0.073) (.)
Last year’s Fund 0.019 0.040
***
(0.050) (0.000)













Chi2 l.f=0.04 & l.d=-0.04 0.64
P-value l.f=0.04 & l.d=-0.04 0.42CESifo Working Paper Series 
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